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TRANSACTIONS or THE NEBRASKA ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 
THE NORMATIVE INCOMPLETENESS OF SOCIAL THEORIES 
Werner Lcinfellner 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska 
1. There are two main reasons to use a metalanguage, when we analyse a 
given informal language (a) of science. The first reason is to avoid semantic 
antinomies of the liar type. The concept of a metalanguage, widely used since 
Tarski (1956: 152-268), proposed to split up the normal informal scientific 
language (a) into an object language (b) and a metalanguage (c). Only within 
the metalanguage (c) we can speak about the object language (b). Ordinary 
informal languages are according to Tarski "closed languages." Closed 
languages make no differences between semantic expressions such as "true," 
which refer to expressions of the object language. If, for example, we assume 
the statement "all decision makers are liars" within the informal language (a) 
then whatever a decision maker says, a contradiction will follow. If he says 
the truth according to the earlier statement he lies and if he lies, then he says 
the truth. Semantic expressions belong therefore in such a stratified language 
system to the metalanguage, which contains two parts: the critical one by 
Tarski called the semantical and the translational part in which the object 
language or object theory is repeated solely by terms of the metalanguage. 
Thus the first reason to introduce a metalanguage was given by the definition 
of truth, or the truth of a statement or proposition S. 
Similar difficulties arose within metamathematics, when Hilbert tried to 
analyse the concept of provability. This second reason is more a syntactic 
one, notwithstanding the fact that any semantic definition of truth demands 
the definition of proofs. If a statement asserts its own unprovability, then it 
follows, that this statement is provable if unprovable, and if unprovable then 
it is provable. Since this holds for any richer formal system according to 
Godel (1931: 176), we have to use a metalanguage, when 'provable' belon&, 
to his metalanguage. The results of Tarski's and Hilbert's introduction of 
metalanguages show clearly (i) that any analysis of especially scientific 
languages which uses critical expressions has to use a metalanguage. Critical 
expressions are linguistic expressions, which refer to other linguistic expres-
sions, such as true, false, provable (ii) that the separation of the object theory 
as well as its formalizatiGJ1 and axiomatization is from the beginning a highly 
artificial procedure. The object language (b) can preserve only approxi-
matively all the characteristic features of the informal theory (a), is therefore 
not an exact mapping of the informal theory (a) into the object theory (b), 
hence a more arbitrarily and artificially reconstructed object theory (b). This 
is important to understand the difference between mathematical object 
theories or between cognitive axiomatized object theories (b) and the actual 
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informal theories (a) of mathematical textbooks or of informal cognitive 
scientific theories (a). In most cases the analyst does not look back any longer 
at thc informal theory (a) if he builds up his object theory (b). Therefore 
philosophy of science cannot analyse the factual given form of science (a) but 
rather a highly idealized, formalized and by axiomatization separated 
paradigm. (iii) The most important result of any meta theoretical analysis of 
sciellce, is, that according to Tarski's remarks, there are far more critical 
expressions in our language, than true, provable (Leinfellner, 1973). 
In fact all intensional expressions such as alethic, modal, deontic, 
normative, belief-expressions can be defined only by means of stratified 
language, which will be called epilanguage. An epilanguage is an extended 
metalanguage. The metalanguage contained in the epilanguage analyses the 
synt~ctic and pure semantic properties of an object theory; this can be 
regarded as the first fundamental step of an analysis which has to be 
complemented by cognitive or descriptive-semantic aspects of the object 
theory (b) to approximate the real informal science (a) under consideration. 
This can be achieved by adding the modal aspect in case of social theories 
(mod~l complementation), by the realization-complement in the case of 
technological theories, by the normative-aspect in the case of action, decision, 
value-theories and by the deontic-aspect in the case of juridical, moral-
theories of social sciences. Thus all the necessary aspects build up step by step 
the so called "background knowledge" of a theory or science. (iv) It is clear 
thal such an epilanguage is "beyond the unbridgeable gap between ex-
tensional and intensional logic (Quine, 1953: 157), since once the syntactic 
and pure semantic features have been analysed in a first step, then in a next 
step, independent of it the deontic analysis provides the "ought" aspect, seen 
from the sole point of view of obligations how to use certain theorems, 
axioms. Therefore, an epilanguage guarantees that the object language is 
value free, whereas the epilanguage itself may contain certain binding norms 
admitting evaluations of scientific sentences of the object language. 
This and similar questions have been discussed recently in the author's 
book (Leinfellner, 1973). Here a specific question is raised, which could be 
called the normative incompleteness of theoretical especially social sciences. 
Maybe the most important action theory, the statistical decision theory under 
uncertainty and risk will be analysed epitheoretically and it will be shown 
that a normal action theory of E-St type is incomplete from a normative 
point of view and how it can be complemented by means of the epilanguage. 
2. Epitheoretical definition of the structure of a decision theory TD under risk and 
uncertainty (statistical decision theory; see Chernoff-Moses (1959) and Menges 
(1969)). 
2.1. The structure (A,E;P,L,R,RR) is called the kernel of the statistical decision theory 
under risk and uncertainty and at the same time the translation into the epitheory 
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ETD if following conditions are fulfilled. 
2.1.1. A is a Boolean field of sets forming with w, a probability measure P, a finite 
additive probability space (A;P), where w E P. 
2.1.2. E is a Boolean field of sets forming with Pe' a probability measure P, a finite 
additive probability space (e,P), where Pc E P. 
2.1.3. X is a Boolean field of sets forming with Px' a probability measure P, a finite 
additive probability space (X,P), where Px E P. 
2.1.4. A is a finite set, the elements of A, ai form n-tuples S, strategies. 
2.1.5. L is a real valued function, 1efined on the set E and the set A L(ei,aj) where eit E 
and ai E A, the values are the aij-
2.1.6. R is a real valued function, defined on the set S and the set E, where 
m 
R(ei'~) =.L L (ei,aj)'px.' 
1-1 I 
and si E S'ej E E,ai E A, and i = 1,2, ... n 
r 
j + 1,2, m. The values of the function R are the a ii 
2.1.7. R R is a real valued function, obtained from the function R by multiplying each 
value afj by the corresponding value P ei' Thus 
l=m 
R R(sj) = _ L R(ei,Sj)Pei 
:=1 
2.1.8. The L,R-functions arc twice differentiable. 
2.1.9. Dl:A strategy is admissible if there are no strategies which dominate it. A strategy s 
dominates a strategy s* if R(ei s) ;? R(ei's*) and if it is not equivalent to any other: 
R(ei's) =F R(ei's*). 
2.1.10. There exists a minimum of the values of R, such that 
* m 
R *(S) = min.(L R(ei,sj)Pei) 
J Fl 
2.1.11. T2: There exists a minimum of the maxima: min max (Pei,a1j) 
This highly formal axiomatization can be regarded as the set-theoretical or 
conceptual framework of our theory, it serves for defining the structure of a part D 
of the world (Leinfellncr, 1965; Lcinfellner, 1967), defines the underlying logic 
epitheorctically and the system of inference, either deductively or probabilistically. 
2.2. Epitheoretical definitions of underlying logic and inferential system: 
2.2.1. The underlying logic is a Bourbakian type set theory (Bourbaki, 1968). 
2.2.2. The underlying inferential system is a mixed classical probabilistic one. 
The axiomatization together with the theorems (or consequences in the probabilistic 
case) have to be complemented by a cognitive or descriptive sematic interpretation. 
Generally any interpretation (representation) is done by rules of representations. 
Representation rules are composed of rules of interpretation or correspondence 
plus designation-rules. Representation is divided into classical and statistical, botb 
decompose into effective or possible ones. Use of possible designation yields tile 
modal aspect of theories, i.e. such a theory refers to a possible, future world. For 
more details see the authors publications (Leinfellner, 1973: 4.6; Leinfellner, 1968: 
196-210; Leinfellner, 1964: 195-213, 238-278). 
2.2.3. Example of an interpretation by means of possible C-rules. (the designation rules are 
omitted here. " ... I - - -" should be read: " ... (belonging to the epitheoretical 
kernel (LT) is interpreted by --", (belonging to an epitheoretically defined empirical 
130 
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
language Lo)' contrary to the common opinion and following recent criticism 
(Suppe, 1972: 1-20) each complementation creates its own empirical language, 
therefore Lo has not the "absolute" character of Carnap-Hempel's observational 
language. Following correspondence rules are important: A/possible actions of 
decision maker; E/random events of the world; X/possible events of a chosen 
sample; W/frequencies of possible events; pe/a-priori frequencies; px/frequency of 
occurrence of x within the sample events; S/possible strategies of the decision 
maker, series of actions; L/possible loss of the decision maker as consequence of the 
actions ai;R/expected loss as consequences of arbitrarily chosen strategies Sj and of 
the events ei; and finally Rr /the risk of L or the risk of the expected losses of the 
sample. 
Since this decision theory deals with possible alternative decisions, called the 
conflict, out of which the decision maker has to choose the optimal, called the 
solution of the conflict the modal-cognitive aspect has been presented elsewhere by 
the author (Leinfellner, 1973). 
2.2.4. The above interpreted theory belongs to the E-St type of behavioristic social 
theories. Generally, there are S-R, E-St, St-St types of social theories. In the first 
case interpretation uses the stimulus(S)-response (R) interpretation, in the second 
case the random-event (E)-strategy interpretation and in the third case the strategy 
(So-·strategy (St) interpretation. What we may observe in our case is therefore, given 
a random event (e), the decision maker may react by a strategy (St). 
3. The normative complementation. 
Normally a decision theory, as outlined in chapter 2 is regarded to be 
complete. But if we apply such a theory we have to add "oughts" i.e. 
obligations for the decision maker f.e. he has to minimize his losses etc. This 
we want to do epitheoretically. Such an epitheoretical complementation can 
be regarded not only as a normative complementation, but as a moral 
foundation of decision making. A short comparison of physics and social 
sciences will illustrate why we should use epitheoretical obligations within 
social sciences. 
The fundamental empirical situation in classical physicS is, that f.e. 
motion of rigid bodies can always be predicted in a classical deterministic 
sense, since the empirical course of motion is a constant one and the only 
variables are location and impulse. Exact deterministic prediction is possible 
because of the constant kinematic "behavior" of rigid bodies under 
consideration. The cognitive aspect of such a theory is a mere predictive one. 
The situation changes completely if human beings and their acts St as well as 
chance events E from which their acts are dependent are the basis D of a 
theory of the type E-St. Beside the random events E we have random factors 
such as the unforseeable random generator of human decision makers called 
free will and the organic wholistic character of social systems which introduce 
a fundamental instability, inconstancy and unrepeatability in D of a social 
theory of E-St type. That is exactly the empirical or on tic situation, which 
has to get under control by the moral commitment. Thus we have to 
introduce a stability and constancy via our deontic or moral commitments. 
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There is another reason for it. All physical classical as well as all cognitive 
sciences are strict cognitive in the sense that they gain knowledge of 
constantly occurring processes, which are endless repeatable given the same 
conditions, but social sciences together with all technological sciences possess 
a different aspect, they are creative realizing sciences. A decision theory 
creates norms and standards of future rational and moral decision behavior 
just in the same sense as we create technical aretefacts by our technology. 
Thus realization of a future societal order by a social theory is completely 
different from recognizing an outbalanced and in the same manner constantly 
occurring classical physical process. Only from outside of science Le. by 
epitheoretically moral commitments (3.1-3.4) we may impose stability and 
constancy on future human behavior, thus introducing a new dimension of 
responsibility for social scientists. 
3.1. Minimal normative complement. The decision maker has to obey by a binding 
predecision following neoutilitarian obligations, if he wants to justify his decision 
making. 
3.2. Every person partaking in a (public) evaluation or decision procedure is obliged to 
use during the decision procedure a well formulated (epitheoretically expressed 
decision framework (f.e. the theory ETD) consisting at least of rules how to use and 
apply it (Rational insight commitment) 
3.3. Each person participating in a (public) evaluation-procedure has to accommodate 
its evaluation (scale) to the evaluation (scale) of the rest, that means has to establish 
an interpersonal utility comparison, in form at least of an ordinal scale. 
(Interpersonal utility committment) 
3.4. Each person partaking in a (public) evaluation or decision procedure has at the 
same time to maximize its utility and expectations and to be prepared for any 
possible compromise admitted by the rules of the decision procedure between best 
and worst expectations (compromise or minimax commitment i.e. Pareto optimal-
ity-demand) . 
These commitments 3.1-3.4 belong to the epitheory, they enable us to 
formulate decision rules or better advice from the point of view of the 
theory TD, whieh are free of the objections and paradoxes usually attributed 
to them. It makes no difference what decision rules we want to use Le. Bayes' 
solution to minimize the expected losses (see theorem 2.1.10) or Wald's 
solution to minimax it. (th. 2.1.11) We may express all these decision rules by 
using deontic operators put before the corresponding theorems. f.e. The 
decision maker is obliged to act according to theorem 2.1.9. By using the 
epitheoretical commitments following results can be achieved and following 
problems be solved (i) the problem of rationality, widely discussed in game, 
decision and action theory which can not be solved by axiomatization alone 
(Harsanyi, 1955: 321; Waldner, 1972: 87-103). (ii) The application of utility, 
game:;. decision-and action-theory to solve social decision procedures (iv) , 
Arrows impossibility theorem (Schwartz, 1970: 89-106) does not affect our' 
theory, the theory presented here is Arrow-immune, (v) Allais paradox can 1>0' 
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resolved wit!. lIt this normatively complemented system (Booth, 1974). (vi) 
Any epithcu, :tically based decision theory can be considered as a moral 
fO\lndJtinll of social sciences. Thus we have shown that the introduction of 
an epilal1,\uage (-theory) is an ideal mean to complete scientific theories, to 
add to T',t'. an extensional metatheoretical aspect an intensional deontic, 
withoU1 ",etting into the well known difficulties (Quine, 1953: 157). 
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